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Turkey’s  New Draft Law on Asylum: What to Make of  It?
Kemal Kirişçi
Introduction
As  Turkey  becomes  increasingly  recognized  as  an  immigration  and  transit 
country for irregular migrants,1 Turkey’s asylum policies are receiving growing 
attention from the public as well  as the international  community. Recently, 
two  conferences  organized  by  the  United  Nations  High  Commissioner  for 
Refugees (UNHCR) in January 2011 and International Organization for Migra-
tion (IOM) in May 2011 with local partners attracted a large attendance com-
posed of academics, civil society representatives, diplomats, and most import-
antly, officials. This interest is partly triggered by the release, in January 2011, of 
Turkey’s first draft asylum law.2 This draft law is the product of an unusually 
transparent process of law-making by Turkish standards that started back in 
late 2008. If the law is indeed adopted by the Parliament, Turkey will finally 
have a legal framework extending protection to asylum seekers and refugees 
together with an accompanying physical as well as administrative infrastruc-
ture. This will constitute a major break from past practice. This development 
also occurs at a time when Turkey’s accession negotiations are fast approach-
ing a dead end. Yet, the head of the team that prepared the draft law acknowl-
edges the role of the European Union (EU) and especially notes that the law is a 
step in the direction of meeting Turkey’s promises in its National Programme 
for the Adoption of the Acquis (NAAP) as well as the Action Plan on Asylum and  
Migration. The importance of preparing for accession negotiations on Chapter 
24 that covers EU acquis in this area is also cited as a reason for the preparation 
of the draft law. 
1 Tolay (forthcoming), Paçacı Elitok/Straubhaar (2011), İçduygu/Kirişçi (2009), Kirişçi (2007 a).
2 Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu Tasarısı Taslağı.
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The draft law brings a significant number of improvements to current 
Turkish  practice  and  would  clearly  ensure  a  better-quality  protection  for 
asylum seekers in Turkey. However, strikingly the law stops short of lifting the 
geographical limitation with which Turkey has been a party to the 1951 Geneva 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Accordingly, Turkey is not obliged 
to extend refugee status to asylum seekers coming to Turkey as a result  of 
“events occurring outside Europe”. The lifting of the limitation is one if not the 
major condition that Turkey has to fulfill for EU membership. The EU has en-
joyed considerable influence on the transformation of Turkish policy on a wide 
range of issues with respect to domestic politics and foreign policy. Turkey in-
troduced  dramatic  reforms  to  meet  the  Copenhagen  political  criteria  and 
transformed its  foreign policy on Cyprus by supporting the United Nations 
Plan to reunite the island to be able to start accession negotiations. Since then 
reforms in relation to a range of chapters that are being negotiated and have 
yet to be opened continues. Hence, against the background of these reforms it 
becomes puzzling as to why the draft law stops short of meeting a major con-
dition of the EU. The EU, through consecutive  Accession Partnerships, Strategy  
Papers and Progress Reports, has unequivocally made it clear to the Turkish side 
that for the completion of the harmonization process the geographical limita-
tion would have to be lifted. This paper will argue that as much as the EU has 
impacted the process of the preparation of the new draft law on asylum, this 
has been a partial one and that the role of European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) and the UNHCR need to be taken into account, too. The UNHCR has 
had a very long-standing relationship with the Turkish government and then 
also with Turkish civil society. This relationship has contributed to a slow but 
sure process of socialization of Turkey into the norms and rules of an interna-
tional refugee regime. Against this background of socialization, the rulings of 
the ECtHR especially in the course of the last couple of years have played a crit-
ical role in creating a climate of urgency to reform Turkey’s asylum policy and 
practice. The paper is divided into three sections. The first section offers a brief 
description of the Turkish asylum system and its evolution. The second section 
discusses the relative roles of the EU, the ECtHR and the UNHCR in this reform 
process and the adoption of the draft law. The paper concludes by suggesting 
that, as much as the draft law is welcomed and is especially promising, as it 
suggests an important transformation in hearts and minds of Turkish officials, 
the acid test will only come if the draft law is indeed adopted and starts to be 
implemented. Even then it will be difficult to ascertain the role of the EU, as 
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the principal demand of the EU, the “lifting of the geographical limitation”, will 
remain unmet and is  likely  to  stay unmet as  long as Turkey’s  prospects  of 
membership remains grim. 
Turkey’s Asylum Policy and Practice
In the West, Turkey is traditionally known as a country of emigration. Yet, Tur-
key, like its predecessor the Ottoman Empire, has long been a country of im-
migration especially for Muslim ethnic groups, ranging from Bosnians to Po-
maks and Tatars, as well as Turks from the Balkans and to a lesser extent from 
the Caucasus and Central Asia. Between 1923 and 1997, more than 1.6 million 
immigrants came and settled in Turkey.3 Furthermore, after the Nazi takeover 
in Germany and then during the Second World War, there were many Jews 
who fled to Turkey and then resettled in Palestine. There were also many who 
fled the German-occupied Balkans for Turkey and returned to their homelands 
after the war had ended. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey has also 
become a country receiving an increasing number of irregular workers and im-
migrants from Balkan countries and former Soviet Republics as well as Iran, 
Northern Iraq and Africa. These often include people that overstay their visa 
and work illegally. Turkey has also been a country of asylum, and is among the 
original signatories of the 1951 Geneva Convention. However, Turkey is today 
among a very small number of countries that still maintains a geographical 
limitation to the agreement’s applicability as defined in Article 1, b(1)(a) of the 
Convention.4 Accordingly,  Turkey  does  not  grant  refugee  status  to  asylum 
seekers coming from outside Europe but has to extend temporary protection, 
and hence maintains a two-tiered asylum policy. 
The first tier of this policy is centered on Europe and is deeply rooted in 
Turkey’s role as a Western ally neighboring the Soviet Union during the Cold 
War. During that period, in close cooperation with the UNHCR, Turkey received 
refugees from the Communist Bloc countries in Europe, including the Soviet 
Union.  Such  refugees,  during  their  stay  in  Turkey,  enjoyed  all  the  rights 
provided for in the 1951 Convention. However, only a very small number were 
allowed to stay in Turkey, often as a result of marriages with Turkish nationals. 
3 For details, see Kirişçi (1996 a).
4 Monaco, Congo and Madagascar are the only remaining countries signatory to the Convention that continue to maintain 
a “geographical limitation”, Joanne (2005).
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Current  Turkish  legislation  limits  immigration  a  full-fledged  refugee  status 
with the integration option only to  persons of  “Turkish descent or  culture”. 
Hence, the overwhelming majority of the refugees were resettled out of Tur-
key. Although it is very difficult to obtain accurate statistics on their numbers, 
the Ministry of Interior (MOI) has indicated that some 13,500 asylum seekers 
benefited from the protection of the 1951 Convention between 1970 and 1996. 
Statistics  for  previous  years  are  not  available.  In  addition, approximately 
20,000 Bosnians were granted temporary asylum in Turkey during hostilities 
in the former Yugoslavia between 1992 and 1995. Some of the refugees were 
housed in a refugee camp near the Bulgarian border, while many went on to 
stay with relatives in large cities such as Istanbul and Bursa. Since the signing 
of the Dayton Peace Plan in 1995, many of these refugees have been steadily 
returning to Bosnia. In 1998 and 1999, approximately 17,000 Kosovars came to 
Turkey to seek protection from the strife in their ancestral homeland. The ma-
jority has returned. There are also an undetermined number of Chechens resid-
ing in Turkey in a somewhat a legally grey zone. Most importantly, in 1989 
more than 310,000 Bulgarian nationals of Pomak and Turkish origin fled to 
Turkey en masse. More than 240,000 of them were naturalized. However, the 
regime change in Bulgaria and membership to the EU culminated with many 
of the refugees returning or taking up dual nationality. Beyond these major 
mass movements of refugees Turkey has received only small numbers of ap-
plications from individuals coming from Europe. Their numbers from 1995 to 
2010 add up only to 289 applications out of which just 30 have received a long-
term residence permit (daimi ikamet). However, there are a greater number of 
asylum seekers such as Chechens from the Russian Federation and some Cen-
tral  Asian republics who have been discouraged from formally applying for 
asylum and instead been allowed to stay on in Turkey sometimes under pre-
carious conditions. 
The second tier of Turkey’s asylum policy deals with persons from outside 
Europe. The new policy emerged in 1980s in the aftermath of the Iranian Re-
volution, and subsequent instability in the Middle East, Africa and Southeast 
Asia. Upheaval in these areas led to a steady increase in the number of asylum 
seekers coming from outside Europe. For a long time, the government allowed 
the UNHCR considerable leeway to temporarily shelter these asylum seekers 
with the tacit understanding that they would be resettled out of Turkey if the 
UNHCR recognized them as refugees, and that those whose claims were re-
jected would be deported. However, the growth in the number of illegal entries 
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into Turkey and in the number of rejected asylum seekers stranded in Turkey 
strained this practice. The situation was also aggravated by the 1988 and 1991 
mass influxes of Kurdish refugees amounting to almost half a million. Officials 
were also concerned that among these asylum seekers were militants of the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan – PKK) trying to enter 
Turkey from Northern Iraq. 
It was against such a background that the government introduced a de-
cree, the Asylum Regulation, in November 1994.5 The Regulation became the 
first piece of legislation at the national level and ambitiously aimed to bring 
status  determination  under  the  control  of  the  Turkish  government.  It  was 
primarily drafted with national security concerns and hence introduced strict 
regulations governing access to asylum procedures with little regard for the 
rights of asylum seekers and refugees.6 It is not surprising that the practice 
that evolved in the first few years of the application of the Regulation attracted 
serious and concerted criticism from Western governments, as well as major 
international human rights advocacy groups.7 Critics argued that Turkey was 
undermining the rights of asylum seekers and refugees by denying them ac-
cess to asylum procedures or failing to provide them adequate protection by 
violating the principle of non-refoulement. The Regulation had introduced the 
requirement that asylum applications be filed within maximum five days of 
entry into Turkey. The rule was often interpreted strictly and applications were 
refused on the grounds of being late. Such refusals were often followed by de-
portations. There were also cases of bona fide refugees recognized by the UN-
HCR being deported on the grounds that these persons had never actually filed 
applications with Turkish authorities and were in violation of the regulation. 
This led to frequent conflicts between Turkish authorities and the UNHCR that 
continued to receive applications and assess them on their merits independ-
ently of the provisions of the Asylum Regulation.
However, the situation began somewhat to improve by the late 1990s. In-
terestingly, a good part of these improvements began to occur before the EU 
actually engaged Turkey as a candidate country for membership and where 
primarily encouraged by the UNHCR. There were a number of reforms. Most 
importantly, in 1997 the way to judicial appeal was opened when two local ad-
5 See Official Gazette (1994).
6 Kirişçi (1996 b), Kirişçi (2007 b, pp. 170–183), Frelick (1997 a), Zieck (2010). 
7 For example, see the U. S. Department of State: Turkey Country Report on Human Rights for 1996 and Frelick (1997 b). 
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ministrative  courts  ruled  against  the  deportation  orders  on  two  Iranian 
refugees recognized by the UNHCR. These refugees had originally entered the 
country illegally and had not filed in their applications with the Turkish au-
thorities in time. The Ministry of Interior (MOI) had ruled for their deportation 
under the provisions of the 1994 Asylum Regulation. The MOI’s appeal to a 
higher court against the decision of the lower courts was struck out, too. The 
UNHCR played an important role in encouraging and supporting the asylum 
seekers to approach the courts and try the judicial appeal process. This was 
also accompanied by an ECtHR ruling (Jabari v Turkey)8 against the deporta-
tion of an asylum seeker on the grounds of the provisions of the 1994 Regula-
tion and that, if this order was carried out, this would constitute a violation of 
the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights.  These  judicial  developments 
played a central role in getting the government to amend the Regulation in 
1999 by initially extending the time limit to ten days.9 
Another indirect reform of the Turkish asylum policy came through the 
introduction of training seminars initially for the Foreigners Department of 
the Police. The first of these took place in September 1998 and involved officials 
that directly dealt with asylum seekers and refugees. These early seminars or-
ganized by the UNHCR were the first of their kind. A steady stream of officials 
went through these seminars assisting the gradual accumulation of expertise 
accompanied  with  a  process  of  socialization. This  process  significantly  im-
proved the officials’ understanding of the issues involved and helped them be-
come familiar with international standards. These seminars also contributed 
to  a  significant  change  in  the  attitudes  of  many  of  these  officials  towards 
asylum seekers and refugees. The training programs were gradually expanded 
to include other officials such as judges, prosecutors and gendarmes, as well. 
Gendarmes  are  often  the  very  first  people  that  asylum  seekers  would  en-
counter in border areas. Awareness programs to differentiate between illegal 
immigrants and asylum seekers were introduced to the training of the Gen-
darmerie. Programs were also held with the Bar Associations for prosecutors 
and judges focusing on refugee law. The police and gendarmes normally have 
to  report  immigrants  or  foreigners  illegally  present  in  Turkey  to  the  local 
courts. Hence, prosecutors and judges play a critical role in whether such per-
sons are deported or not. The seminars in these respects were critical in raising 
8 Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights (20oo).
9 Official Gazette (1999).
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awareness of a body of law and practice to help distinguish between illegal im-
migrants and asylum seekers and Turkey’s legal obligations under international 
law.  
A parallel development was the growing cooperation between non-gov-
ernmental organizations and the government. An increasing number of non-
governmental organizations ranging from the Turkish branch of Amnesty In-
ternational to the International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) began 
to  cooperate  with  the  government in  organizing  and  running  some  of  the 
above training programs for officials but also seminars for lawyers and human 
rights activists. The UNHCR branch office in Ankara actually took the initiative 
to encourage the establishment of the first Turkish Non-Governmental Organi-
zation (NGO), the Association of Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants, 
in 1995 dealing solely with refugee-related issues. The UNHCR also instituted 
the practice of organizing seminars with first human- rights associations and 
then began to include also NGOs focusing on social issues such as women’s 
and children’s rights as well as local NGOs extending humanitarian assistance 
to asylum seekers and refugees. Bar Associations in big cities such as Ankara, 
Istanbul and İzmir, as well as some border towns, also developed various sup-
port programs geared to providing legal assistance for asylum seekers as well 
as training programs on asylum law and human rights of asylum seekers to 
their members. More recently, a group of NGOs interested especially in the hu-
man-rights dimension of asylum formed the Platform of Refugee Rights (Mül-
teci Hakları Koordinasyonu). In due course, some of these NGOs also developed 
an expertise in filing complaints with local courts as well as the ECtHR. Actu-
ally, they did not hesitate to instrumentalize the ECtHR to put pressure on the 
government for reform. 
More importantly and in a most fascinating manner  the close coopera-
tion between the UNHCR and the Turkish authorities culminated in a situation 
where the UNHCR came to perform de facto refugee status determination on 
behalf of Turkey. Even though the Asylum Regulation identified the MOI as the 
body responsible for status determination, MOI officials came to rely increas-
ingly on the judgment of the UNHCR. They were quite content to go along 
with UNHCR decisions as long as the asylum seekers were also registered with 
them and eventually those who were recognized as refugees did get resettled 
out of Turkey. The occasional differences were usually sorted out through in-
formal  consultations. Training seminars  and close cooperation also enabled 
the  UNHCR  to  gain  access  to  groups  of  irregular  migrants  that  got  appre-
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hended by the Turkish authorities, particularly in border regions of Turkey. Ac-
cording to Turkish government statistics  there were approximately 3,500 to 
4,000 asylum applicants filed a year between 1995 and December 2008 while 
for the last three years the average has gone up to about 9,000 (Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Asylum Application in Turkey (1995–2010)
The figures include asylum seekers from Europe * and outside Europe **.
* Includes Albania, Belgium, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Germany, Georgia, Greece, Italy, Macedonia, Romania, Switzer-
land, Ukraine and Yugoslavia.
** Includes Algeria, Bangladesh, Birmania (Myanmar), Burma, Burundi, China, Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia,  
Ghana, Guinea, India, Israel,  Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Liberia,  
Libya,  Malaysia,  Mauritania,  Morocco,  Nigeria,  Pakistan,  Palestine,  Philippines,  Rwanda,  Sierra  Leone,  Sri  
Lanka, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United States of America, Yemen  
and Zaire. 
Source: Data obtained from the Foreigners Department of MOI. Data current as of 10.1.2011.
An overwhelming majority of the asylum seekers are from Iran and Iraq. Dur-
ing this period there were a total of more than almost 77,400 asylum applica-
tions and just above 39,000 of them were recognized as refugees (see Table 1). 
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Table 1: Applications under 1994 Regulation in Turkey (1995–2010)
Country Applications Accepted Rejected Pending Undetermined Status
cases cases cases
Iraq 30,342 15,647 5,368 6,720 2,607
Iran 35,468 21,784 3,723 7,434 2,527
Russia 99 15 52 14 18
Afghanistan 5,947 571 368 4,912 96
Uzbekistan 402 96 75 189 42
Azerbaijan 55 3 25 16 11
Other* 144 58 64 11 11
Other** 4,973 994 477 3,248 254
Total 77,430 39,168 10,152 22,544 5,566
* Includes Albania, Armenia, Belgium, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Germany, Georgia, Greece, Italy, Macedonia, Moldova, 
Romania, Switzerland, Ukraine and Yugoslavia.
** Includes Angola,  Algeria,  Bangladesh, Belarus, Birmania (Myanmar),  Burma,  Burundi,  Cameroon, Central  
African Republic, China, Congo, Cuba, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Israel, Ivory  
Coast,  Jordan,  Kazakhstan,  Kenya, Kuwait,  Kyrgyzstan,  Lebanon, Liberia,  Libya, Malaysia,  Mali,  Mongolia,  
Mauritania, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Philippines, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, 
Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Somalia,  Stateless,  Sudan, Syria,  Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia,  
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United States of America, West Sahara, Yemen and Zaire. 
Source: Data obtained from the Foreigners Department of MOI. Data current as of 10.1.2011.
The overwhelming majority of the recognized refugees were resettled out of 
Turkey mostly to the United States and Canada but also a number of EU coun-
tries (Table 2).10
10 The figure of refugees and resettled refugees has to be interpreted cautiously, as the grand figures included refugees 
with applications pre-dating 1995. 
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Table 2: Resettlement out of Turkey by Country of Origin and Country of Settlement
Country of Origin Country of Settlement 
Canada USA Oceania Other 
Europe
Scandinavia Others Total
Afghanistan 192 258 3 17 89 559
Iran 4,841 10,061 2,921 269 3,667 12 21,771
Iraq 1,043 10,335 1,788 689 1,732 33 15,620
Africa 436 326 1 7 55 825
North Africa 15 1 16
Asia 34 13 145
Middle East 74 4 10 7 6 1 102
Bosnia Herzegovina 45 1 46
Total 6,699 21,063 4,723 990 5,563 46 39,084
Africa: Angola, Burundi, Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Pakistan, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, Sudan
North Africa: Guinea, Mauritania, Morocco, Libya, Tunisia  
Asia: Burma, China, India, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Sri Lanka  
Middle East: Jordan, Palestine, Syria, Egypt, Yemen
Oceania: Australia, New Zealand
Other Europe: Austria, Britain, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Spain,  
Switzerland, Ukraine, Greece, Poland, Czech Republic, Belgium
Scandinavia: Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden
Others: Azerbaijan, Bosnia Herzegovina, Dubai, Indonesia, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab 
Emirates
Source: Data obtained from the Foreigners Department of MOI. Data current as of 10.1.2011.
EU Rule Adoption and Transforming the Turkish Asylum System
It is extremely difficult to judge the impact and the timing of the EU’s role in 
this process of transformation. This is the case because the EU came on to the 
scene at a time when a “paradigmatic shift” was occurring among Turkish offi-
cials, primarily a product of the UNHCR’s long and patient engagement of Tur-
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key. This was a shift from a paradigm that framed the issue of asylum policy 
from a primarily “national security” perspective to one that increasingly em-
phasized human rights and international refugee law. The role of the EU has 
been more visible in respect to the setting of a formal agenda and a time-table 
for eventual “rule adoption” for Turkish policy. In this respect, the consecutive 
Accession Partnership documents of 2001 and subsequent ones clearly induced 
Turkish officials to recognize that at some point the lifting of the geographical 
limitation  would  have  to  take  place  and  that  Turkey  would  have  to  adopt 
structural and institutional as well as legislative reforms. In 2002 the govern-
ment formed a Task Force that brought together officials from various agen-
cies, possibly for the first time in their history, to actually discuss what needed 
to be done to meet the conditions set by these documents. These documents 
also broadened the scope of the ongoing informal debate between officials di-
rectly dealing with asylum on the one hand and academics and experts as well 
as representatives of non-governmental organizations and the UNHCR on the 
other. 
The  EU’s  High  Level  Working  Group  (HLWG)  on Turkey did  also  make 
funds  and  experts  available  for  training  seminars  specifically  on  asylum.11 
These seminars were critical in the words of a UNHCR official in helping to de-
velop a “common language” between Turkish officials and their EU counter-
parts.12 Furthermore, the adoption of the NAAP was also critical given its ac-
ceptance  to  lift  the  geographical  limitation  despite  the  conditions  it  set. 
However, more important in this respect was the “twinning project” that the 
British and Danish governments supported. This project not only enabled Turk-
ish officials possibly for the first time in their careers to work for months on a 
daily basis with their EU counterparts but the exercise also helped Turkish au-
thorities to prepare the  Action Plan on Asylum and Migration  that was sub-
sequently adopted by the government in March 2005.13 This document in great 
detail identified both national legislation and the EU acquis on asylum and mi-
gration. It also laid out in broad outlines the tasks and time-table that Turkey 
intended to follow to prepare Turkey for the development of a fully fledged na-
tional status-determination system, lift the geographical limitation and adopt 
EU directives on asylum and migration in general. 
11 For a detailed analysis of the HLWG of the EU, see Selm (2002).
12 Exchange of email messages with a UNHCR official in Ankara.
13 The Turkish National Action Plan for the Adoption of the EU Aquis in the Field of Asylum and Migration was officially  
adopted by the Turkish government on March 25, 2005. 
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The renewed Accession Partnership adopted in January 2006 subsequent 
to the beginning of accession talks with Turkey in October 2005 set a medium 
period (the end of 2009) as the deadline for the completion of the “rule adop-
tion” exercise and the lifting of the geographical limitation. The document also 
expected Turkey, in the area of asylum, to make visible progress in setting up 
reception centers for asylum seekers, to develop a country of origin informa-
tion system, to introduce national asylum legislation and to set up a special-
ized administrative unit to deal with asylum and status determination. In the 
meantime, the screening process concerning Chapter 24 dealing with asylum 
was completed in 2007. The report of the Commission concerning the outcome 
of the screening process highlighted the gaps in the area of asylum and con-
siders Turkey not to be compliant with the EU acquis.14 However, the report to 
this day has still not been formally adopted as Cyprus and France continue to 
block the opening of accession negotiations on Chapter 24. Naturally, these de-
velopments aggravate doubts about the EU’s credibility and deeply influence 
Turkish public policy makers’ cost calculation.
Turkish decision-makers have been fully aware that previous candidate 
countries had to go through a similar “rule-adoption” process. They are also 
aware that there were a number of countries that had to lift their geographical 
limitations such as Hungary, Latvia and Malta and that the first two countries 
did so well before their accession negotiations started.15 They also realize that 
they have to follow suit. However, they have faced a major dilemma provoked 
by their mistrust of the EU’s credibility in respect to the ultimate “reward” of 
membership. The greatest nightmare scenario for them is one in which they 
would  find  themselves  lifting  the  geographical  limitation  without  Turkey’s 
membership being taken seriously by the EU. Turkish officials are also con-
scious and deeply affected by the European public resistance to Turkish mem-
bership. They also have firsthand knowledge of the experience of their coun-
terparts  in  some  of  the  new  member  countries  against  which  they  can 
compare their own dilemmas and “cost-benefit” calculation matrices. They are 
deeply aware that their counterparts, when making a critical decision, were 
pretty much confident that eventually membership would take place. A high-
level MOI official involved in asylum issues for almost a decade and an advo-
cate of the reform of the Turkish asylum system put his deep concerns pretty 
14 European Commission Enlargement (2010).
15 These countries maintained their “geographical limitation” until 1998, 1997 and 2002 respectively.
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bluntly. This official during a visit to Hungary to learn about the Hungarian ex-
perience of lifting their geographical limitation and putting into place a fully 
fledged  asylum  system  had  actually  asked  his  Hungarian  counterpart  how 
they were able to take on financially and politically very costly decisions. The 
Turkish official reflected on how “his heart sank” when his Hungarian counter-
part simply said that this was never a major concern for them because they were 
always sure that they would become a member of the EU at the end.16 
Another  issue  that  marks  the  cost  calculation  of  Turkish  officials  is 
burden-sharing. Owing to its geographical location, Turkish officials are con-
scious that Turkey risks becoming a buffer zone or a dumping ground for the 
EU’s unwanted asylum seekers and refugees. The adoption of the current  ac-
quis  would make Turkey a  typical  “first  country of  asylum” responsible  for 
status  determination  with  membership  and  a  “safe  third  country  of  first 
asylum” before  then.17 This  raises  considerable  concerns  among  officials  in 
terms of the economic, social and political implications. Turkish officials will 
expect to see burden-sharing mechanisms that would go beyond what the cur-
rent Refugee Fund can offer.18 Traditionally, refugees have been resettled out of 
Turkey. Turkish officials  want to see an arrangement that would allow this 
practice to continue for some transitional period. However, the current acquis  
does not allow for such a practice.19 This fear of becoming a buffer zone is also 
aggravated by Turkish officials’ perception of a growing EU tendency to exter-
nalize its asylum policies and its efforts to create a “fortress Europe”. Ironically, 
these officials learn about the details of these policies from the very experts 
and representatives of non-governmental organizations that they encounter 
during training seminars and conferences. In other words, a Europe that tries 
to complicate if not deny access to asylum seekers to reach the EU is not set-
ting a good example for Turkey in terms of harmonization and credibility. 
Nevertheless, the impact of the transformation that has been going on in 
the area of asylum over the last decade had been nudging Turkey towards a po-
sition that is closer to the one that is more in parallel with EU demands. In June 
16 The visit took place between May 22–26, 2006 as a part of a project supported by the British government and the Inter-
national Catholic Migration Commission.
17 Council of the European Union (2003).
18 Commission of the European Communities Commission (1999), Council of the European Union (2000).
19 The issue of burden-sharing has been one of the difficult challenges that member states faced in developing a common 
asylum policy; see Thielemann (2003, pp. 253–273), Thielemann (2005, pp. 807–824). This challenge has been greater in the 
case of candidate countries; see Byrne (2003, pp. 336–358).
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2006 the Department, responsible for asylum matters, circulated an internal 
regulation20 (Genelge) that, according to a high-ranking UNHCR official, “pleas-
antly surprised them”.21 The document basically sends instructions to the po-
lice in general to speed and facilitate the implementation of tasks laid out in 
the  Action Plan. In its introduction, it recognizes that the regulation aims to 
meet the standards mentioned in the 1951 Geneva Convention and the EU ac-
quis. It  introduces very specific measures that aim to improve access to the 
asylum system and ensure continuity for the trained personnel in their cur-
rent position rather than to risk being moved to other irrelevant tasks as part 
of the standard rotation system. It lays out for the first time rules concerning 
the  process  of  identity-determination  of  asylum  seekers  as  well  as  clearly 
states that asylum seekers may well enter the country without identity and 
that this cannot be held against them.22 Furthermore, this internal regulation 
also identifies the procedures to be followed to determine the outcome of an 
asylum application and appeal procedures for rejected cases. It also incorpo-
rates elements from current EU directives concerning country of origin infor-
mation, provision  of  translation  facilities  and  a  positive  interview  environ-
ment. Lastly, it also underlines that refugees and asylum seekers having a valid 
residence permit would be entitled to a work permit, too, and it provides for 
the  granting  of  “secondary” or  “subsidiary” protection  short  of  full  refugee 
status. A close reading of the Regulation reveals that the authors of the Regula-
tion benefitted closely from the EU’s “Qualifications” Directive, betraying one 
of the most conspicuous manifestations of “rule adoption” thus far. 
However, this Regulation did not bring a major improvement in the situ-
ation of asylum seekers in Turkey. At least two reasons played a role in this 
outcome. Firstly, the  enthusiasm  to  reform  and  adapt  Turkish  practice  and 
policy to EU norms reflected in the NAAP and the Action Plan fizzled out as EU-
Turkish relations began to deteriorate from late 2006 onwards. 
The mood to resist “conditionality” and “rule adoption” was captured in a 
very  telling  manner  by  a  high-ranking  Turkish  diplomat  at  a  meeting  in 
September 2007 with UNHCR officials. He made references to the Negotiation 
Framework and noted that “if the EU aims to keep the negotiations open-
20 İçişleri Bakanlığı (2006). 
21 Interview with a high-ranking UNHCR official.
22 This is extremely fascinating because the principle that asylum seekers cannot be denied access to asylum procedures on 
the ground of false papers or no identity papers was a point that would come up regularly in the context of the discussion 
of the 1951 Geneva Convention.
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ended so we shall also keep developments open-ended”. He added the impor-
tance that Turkey attributes to “reciprocity” and noted that during the pre-ac-
cession  period  Turkey  would  adopt  those  rules  and  regulations  that  are 
deemed to benefit Turkey. Turkey on the other hand would keep an “open-ended” 
approach to the adoption of policies that do not offer mutual benefit. He gave 
the lifting of the geographical limitation as an example of an area where Tur-
key would be reluctant to adopt EU acquis as long as uncertainty over Turkish 
membership prevails.23
A second reason stemmed from the situation deteriorating in Iraq and 
also in Somali resulting in a sudden and significant increase in the number of 
asylum seekers coming to Turkey. This led to the security-oriented approach in 
Turkey to make itself felt again. One important consequence of this was an in-
crease in cases of refoulement as well as a growth in complaints about access 
to asylum procedures. A growing number of non-governmental organizations, 
including the Turkish branch of Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly, as well as the Hu-
man Rights  Watch  (HRW), became critical  of  government policies  and pub-
lished reports that attracted considerable public attention.24 This was also fol-
lowed in 2009 by a Council of Europe report prepared by Thomas Hammerberg 
raising very specific criticisms ranging from the practice of obliging asylum 
seekers to pay residence permit fees to inhumane conditions in detention cen-
ters.  Most  importantly,  in  2009  the  ECtHR  in  its  decision  Abdolkhani  and 
Karimnia found Turkey in violation of a number of articles of European Hu-
man Rights Convention (EHRC) resulting from attempts to deport two Iranian 
refugees to Iran and for denying them access to contest deportation decisions. 
The ECtHR also sentenced Turkey to pay a substantial sum of reparations to 
the  complainants.  Furthermore,  the  Court  concluded  that  Turkey  failed  to 
provide effective remedy opening the way for accepting applications without 
seeing the exhaustion of domestic paths to remedy. This decision became a 
turning point. During the period from 1991 to 2008 there had been 13 cases that 
were taken to the Court and only one had led to a conviction against Turkey. 
However, the case of  Abdolkhani and Karimnia was followed by twelve addi-
tional cases culminating in rulings of convictions and most accompanied with 
demands for compensation to be paid to the complainants. 
23 Information obtained from the diplomat and third parties present at the meeting. 
24 Helsinki Yurttaşlar Derneği (2007), Human Rights Watch (2008).
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The growing criticisms and the rulings of the ECtHR had very visible ef-
fects. Firstly, the Minister of the Interior, Beşir Atalay, soon after the appear-
ance of the HRW report, appointed in November 2008 two special inspectors to 
investigate the allegations in this report and also why commitments made to 
the EU in the context of the harmonization process were not being met. The in-
vestigation culminated in a major personnel change in the Department of For-
eigners within the police while a new office, the Migration Unit tasked to pre-
pare a draft law on asylum, was set up within the MOI. The office in an effort 
to address some of the more immediate practical complaints and criticisms 
initiated the adoption of a series of new regulations. The first of these regula-
tions  introduced  the  possibility  to  waive  resident  permit  fees  for  asylum 
seekers and refugees as well as measures to improve access to asylum proced-
ures and social services.25 This was followed by two additional regulations in-
troduced by the Social  Services and Child Protection Agency as well  as  the 
Ministry  of  Education extending their  services  to  asylum seekers  and refu-
gees.26 Officials also recognized that ECtHR rulings were “raining on Turkey” 
and that “the current situation is becoming untenable”.27 Turkey did not have 
any other choice but to reform its asylum policies. 
It is against such a background that a draft law was prepared and sent to 
the Prime Minister’s Office in January 2011. This is a law that addresses prac-
tically all the issues raised in the most recent Accession Partnership of 200828 as 
well as the “informal” screening report mentioned above short of lifting the 
geographical limitation. It incorporates the current EU acquis and foresees the 
setting up of a separate authority to deal with asylum and other migration-re-
lated issues including provisions to improve the integration of refugees. Never-
theless, there is a consensus shared by academics, experts and UNHCR officials 
that the draft law and the manner in which this draft has been prepared signify 
a major transformation in Turkey’s asylum policy. It is not surprising that the 
25 İçişleri Bakanlığı (2010).
26 Sosyal Hizmetler ve Çocuk Esirgeme Kurumu (2010).
27 Remarks shared with the author on a number of occasions, in particular during the MiReKoç conference on “Critical Re-
flections in Migration Research: Views from the South and the East”, October 7–9, 2009, Koç University, Istanbul.
28 The Accession Partnership calls for making “progress in the preparations for the adoption of a comprehensive asylum 
law in line with the acquis including the establishment of an asylum authority” (Council of the European Union [2008, 
p. 13]) under “short term priorities” and for continuing “with alignment with the acquis in the field of asylum, in particular 
through the lifting of the geographical limitation to the Geneva Convention and through strengthening protection, social 
support and integration measures for refugees” (Ibid, [p. 17]), under “Medium Term Priorities”.
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United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Guterres became the 
first ever High Commissioner to visit Turkey in November 2010. He used the 
occasion both to praise the government for an open consultation process it 
adopted in preparing the law and for drafting a law that enlarges the protec-
tion space for asylum seekers.29 The UNHCR representative in Ankara stressed 
the similar remarks during the opening of a conference on the “Tradition of 
Asylum in Turkey”. Furthermore, the draft law offers provisions to prevent the 
danger of deportation of any person to countries where their life may be in 
danger or where they risk being tortured as well as provisions that aim to en-
sure the improvement of detention conditions and access to judicial review. 
Hence, the adoption of this draft law needs to be seen as a function of as 
much the socialization effect of the UNHCR and ECtHR on Turkey as harmoni-
zation with EU acquis. This was strikingly evident when the head of the Migra-
tion Unit but also the permanent secretary of the MOI during a UNHCR organ-
ized local conference in Ankara in January 2011 emphasized in their speeches 
the importance in addressing the human rights of asylum seekers. Both offi-
cials argued that the draft law represented a shift in mentality away from a 
purely security- (asayiş) driven approach to one where the focus would be on 
human rights. They also added that the law also reflected a desire “to do things 
for  ourselves (kendimiz için yaptık)  because that  it  is  only  such  a law that 
would live up (yakışır) to a Turkey that has become the 16th largest economy in 
the world”. Undoubtedly, these are words that do represent political considera-
tions and a desire to curry favor with the public and international community. 
The conference was after all  organized by the UNHCR, was attended by the 
diplomatic corps in Ankara and was held just before the first-ever visit of a 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to Turkey. However, this kind 
of language was absent in the discourse of high-level officials previously and it 
is also highly unusual that Turkish bureaucrats will speak, even implicitly, crit-
ically of a previous practice in front of a public audience attended by foreign 
officials. For  someone  who  has  observed the  asylum scene  in  Turkey  since 
1989, I believe this transformation in language can at least partly be attributed 
to a greater sense of associating oneself with the broader international com-
munity dealing with asylum issues. 
29 Today’s Zaman (2010).
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Conclusion
This paper focused on the adoption of a draft law on asylum that aims to re-
form Turkey’s asylum policy and practice. The law would open the way to Tur-
key meeting most of the requirements set by the EU short of the lifting of the 
geographical limitation to the 1951 Geneva Convention. This is a stark reminder 
of the limits of EU “conditionality”. Otherwise a strong inducer of reform, in the 
case  of  Turkey  it  is  problematic. EU-Turkish  relations  have  reached  a  point 
where on the Turkish side the expectation of eventual membership occurring 
is low. Asylum actually belongs to a chapter that is currently blocked from be-
ing opened by the vetoes of a number of member states. Hence, the paper ar-
gued that at least part of the explanation for reform lies in the influence that 
the UNHCR and the ECtHR have enjoyed. In the case of the UNHCR, this influ-
ence has been spread across almost two decades during which the UNHCR 
contributed to the socialization of Turkish officials and civil-society represent-
ations to the norms of international refugee law. In the case of ECtHR, the in-
fluence is much more recent and more of a direct one. The authors of the draft 
law openly acknowledge this influence by referring to the rulings of the Court 
against Turkey and the need to respond to it. It will actually be interesting to 
follow the fate of this draft law and see what happens when the legislative 
process starts. The ultimate test of where the balance among these three insti-
tutions as inducers of reform lie will surely become much clearer once the law 
becomes operational and starts to be implemented. The ultimate test, however, 
will still depend on the lifting of the geographical limitation and that seems 
unlikely to happen unless the prospects of EU membership for Turkey become 
credible.
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